Prof. Dr. Ebubekir Sofuoğlu – “Ulu Hakan Sultan Abdülhamid Han” (2019)

Introduction

In a public lecture delivered in 2019, Professor Ebubekir Sofuoğlu offered a revisionist interpretation of the late Ottoman period, with particular emphasis on the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The lecture combined an overview of succession crises, an analysis of court intrigues centered on the statesman Reşit Paşa, and a “what-if” scenario concerning Ottoman oil. Below is a summary of his main arguments, the evidence he invoked, and observations that place his narrative within current historiography.

Context and Central Thesis

Sofuoğlu begins by noting that nine sultans ruled between 1848 and 1909, six of whom were removed by force (deposition or assassination), while three died without direct intervention. He interprets this pattern as evidence of a “coup government” operating behind the façade of hereditary monarchy. His core claim is that the empire’s decline was not inevitable but the result of internal betrayal and foreign manipulation that thwarted reform projects—above all those of Sultan Abdülhamid II.

Succession Crises: A Brief Overview

• Mahmud II (1808–39) – 30 years of centralizing reforms; died of natural causes.
• Abdülmecid I (1839–66) – Tanzimat era; assassinated by a disgruntled officer in 1866.
• Abdülaziz (1867–78) – deposed by the “1876 coup”; later found dead under mysterious circumstances.
• Murad V (1876) – reigned three months before being deposed on grounds of mental health.
• Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) – dethroned after the Young Turk Revolution and placed under house arrest.

Sofuoğlu stresses that Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I, although not openly overthrown, were nevertheless constrained by powerful viziers—especially Reşit Paşa—who steered imperial policy away from genuine sovereign authority.

Reşit Paşa: The “Puppet-Master”

According to the lecture, Reşit Paşa (grand vizier 1846–49 and again 1859–62) exercised decisive influence over several key events:

1. The deposition of Abdülaziz – Sofuoğlu argues that Paşa’s correspondence with European diplomats facilitated the palace coup that removed Abdülaziz in May 1876.
2. Manipulation of imperial decrees – He cites a document (İmparatorluk Fermanı No. 342/1841), allegedly forged under Paşa’s direction, which later served as legal justification for the 1841 London Straits Convention.
3. Economic concessions – The Balta Limanı commercial agreement (1856), which granted British-controlled port privileges in Istanbul, is presented as a direct result of Paşa’s willingness to trade sovereignty for fiscal relief.

In Sofuoğlu’s view, Reşit Paşa functioned as an early “state within the state,” undermining the autonomy of the sultanate.

Sultan Abdülhamid II: Modernizer or Autocrat?

Sofuoğlu paints a nuanced portrait of Abdülhamid II:

• Intelligence network – He founded the Mimâriye-i Umumiye (later known as “Hamidiye”) and expanded secret police activity to monitor dissent.
• Diplomatic initiative – The sultan pursued rapprochement with Germany, signed the 1881 German–Ottoman railway contract and negotiated oil concessions in Mesopotamia.
• Domestic reforms – Educational expansion (for example the founding of the Mekteb-i Şâire), infrastructure projects (railways, telegraph lines) and limited press liberalization are highlighted as evidence of progressive intent.

Nevertheless, Sofuoğlu contends that internal opposition—particularly the alleged “five-person cells” linked to foreign powers—sabotaged these reforms and hastened the empire’s territorial losses.

The “Five-Person Cells” Thesis

The lecturer refers to clandestine groups of five operatives each, said to be agents of Britain, France or Italy. He claims that:

• these cells infiltrated the Ottoman bureaucracy and spread misinformation;
• their activities contributed to the destabilization that culminated in the 1878 crisis and later in the Young Turk Revolution.

This hypothesis lacks corroborating primary sources in mainstream scholarship; most historians attribute the Ottoman defeats of this period primarily to military imbalance, nationalist uprisings and diplomatic isolation rather than to covert networks.

Territorial Losses: Diplomacy or Mismanagement?

Sofuoğlu lists the territories that slipped from Ottoman control between 1878 and 1909 (Crete, Cyprus, Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria, Bosnia–Herzegovina) and attributes these losses to two interrelated factors:

1. Strategic errors – The failure to negotiate with Montenegro over the villages of Nikşik and Kolaşin is presented as the spark for the 93 War (1877–78), which opened a cascade of Balkan secessions.
2. Foreign pressure – The 1841 London Straits Convention, the 1885 Berlin Treaty and the 1908 annexation of Cyprus by Britain are framed as outcomes of foreign powers exploiting Ottoman weakness.

The lecture emphasizes that, had Abdülhamid II been allowed to continue his reforms uninterrupted, these concessions could have been avoided.

Counterfactual Scenario: Oil and Prosperity

A striking element of the lecture is the claim that by 1908 Ottoman authorities had identified 106 oil fields across Mesopotamia, a figure drawn from German–Ottoman geological surveys of the time. Sofuoğlu argues:

• had these resources been developed under a stable Abdülhamid II, the empire could have become one of the world’s wealthiest states;
• the sultan’s deposition halted investment and cost revenue that might have funded military modernization and economic diversification.

While the existence of numerous oil prospects is historically accurate, modern scholarship cautions against deterministic “what-if” narratives; technical, financial and geopolitical obstacles would likely have limited large-scale exploitation even under a more stable government.

Conclusion

Professor Ebubekir Sofuoğlu’s 2019 lecture offers an engaging, if at times speculative, reinterpretation of the late Ottoman era. Its strengths lie in:

• a clear chronological mapping of succession crises and their political implications;
• an emphasis on the agency of high officials such as Reşit Paşa in shaping imperial policy.

Certain claims—most notably the “five-person cells” and the deterministic link between oil and Ottoman survival—would require stronger evidence before they could enter mainstream historiography. Nonetheless, the lecture stimulates valuable discussion about the interplay of reform, court intrigue and foreign intervention in a period usually portrayed as one of inevitable decline.